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Abstract
Section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code permits chapter 11 debtors to retain claims
and interests post-confirmation through the plan of reorganization. This section promotes the
maximization of the bankruptcy estate, which in turn increases distributions to creditors. While
plan confirmation under §1141 typically has a res judicata effect, binding all parties and block-
ing potential causes of action, §1123(b)(3)(B) provides an exception. The broad language of
§1123(b)(3)(B), however, provides minimal guidance as to how specific reservations must be in
order to successfully retain causes of action. Courts fluctuate between allowing extremely broad
claims reservations and requiring either categorical reservations or the explicit reservation of in-
dividual claims. Courts have even considered the sufficiency of claims reservations contained in
disclosure statements, including when the reservations are not necessarily addressed in the plan.
This Note analyzes the various methods courts employ in the application of §1123(b)(3)(B), and
it proposes a compromise that promotes both the finality of plan confirmation as well as the maxi-
mization of the bankruptcy estate.
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ABSTRACT 
Section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code permits chapter 11 
debtors to retain claims and interests post-confirmation through the 
plan of reorganization.  This section promotes the maximization of 
the bankruptcy estate, which in turn increases distributions to 
creditors.  While plan confirmation under § 1141 typically has a res 
judicata effect, binding all parties and blocking potential causes of 
action, § 1123(b)(3)(B) provides an exception.  The broad language 
of § 1123(b)(3)(B), however, provides minimal guidance as to how 
specific reservations must be in order to successfully retain causes of 
action.  Courts fluctuate between allowing extremely broad claims 
reservations and requiring either categorical reservations or the 
explicit reservation of individual claims. Courts have even 
considered the sufficiency of claims reservations contained in 
disclosure statements, including when the reservations are not 
necessarily addressed in the plan.  This Note analyzes the various 
methods courts employ in the application of § 1123(b)(3)(B), and it 
proposes a compromise that promotes both the finality of plan 
confirmation as well as the maximization of the bankruptcy estate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Congress designed chapter 11 bankruptcy to enable a business to 
restructure itself so that it might continue to operate in its normal course 
despite present or impending insolvency. 1   Chapter 11 balances the 
countervailing interests of debtors and creditors by allowing debtors to 
reorganize their businesses, while simultaneously repaying their debts 
																																																																																																																																													
 1. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963, 6179 (“The purpose of a business reorganization case . . . is to restructure a 
business’s finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, 
pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders.  The premise of a business 
reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the industry for which they 
were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap.”). 
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by providing reasonable distributions to their creditors.2   It seeks to 
maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate by providing a mechanism 
for debtors to form new contractual relationships with creditors—
relationships that endure after the debtor emerges from bankruptcy—
through the plan of reorganization.3  If successful, chapter 11 permits a 
business to discharge its debts 4  and emerge from bankruptcy, 
rehabilitated and able to continue as a going concern.5 
As chapter 11 practice has evolved, businesses have increasingly 
used its provisions as restructuring tools prior to actual insolvency.6  As 
																																																																																																																																													
 2. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 51 (2008); 
see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 775, 776 (1964). 
 3. Peter C. Blain, Michael D. Jankowski & Bret M. Harper, State Law Offers an 
Alternative to Chapter 11, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 29, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/ 
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202475325560&State_law_offers_an_alternative_to_Chapter_
11. 
 4. See Chapter 11:  Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, UNITED STATES 
COURTS, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy 
/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter11.aspx (“Section 1141(d)(1) generally provides that 
confirmation of a plan discharges a debtor from any debt that arose before the date of 
confirmation. After the plan is confirmed, the debtor is required to make plan payments 
and is bound by the provisions of the plan of reorganization. The confirmed plan creates 
new contractual rights, replacing or superseding pre-bankruptcy contracts.”). 
 5. See N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984) (“[T]he policy 
of chapter 11 is to permit successful rehabilitation of debtors.”); see also Christopher R. 
Kaup & J. Daryl Dorsey, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy:  A Primer, 28 GPSolo 5 (2011), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp_solo/2011/july_august/ 
chapter_11_bankruptcy_primer.html.  Ultimately, chapter 11 provides businesses with 
an alternative to chapter 7 liquidation.  Chapter 7 provides for the liquidation of the 
debtor’s assets and the distribution of the proceeds to the creditors, whereas chapter 11 
allows for the rehabilitation of a financially distressed debtor. Donald Lee Rome, The 
New Bankruptcy Act and the Commercial Lender, 96 BANKING L.J. 389, 390 (1979).  
Management generally enters into chapter 11 cases with the desire to revitalize their 
business, through plan confirmation and the repayment of creditors. Information for 
Prospective Creditor Committee Members on Chapter 11 Cases, THE UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/private_trustee/ 
library/chapter11/docs/credcom.pdf.  Where a firm has a large number of secured 
creditors, chapter 11 may provide greater efficiency, while also enabling the firm to 
successfully reorganize and emerge from bankruptcy. Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning 
Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy:  Chapter 7 Liquidation Versus Chapter 11 
Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253, 1261 (2006). 
 6. Corporations use bankruptcy as a means to restructure their finances for a 
variety of operational reasons.  Chapter 11 provides a means for debtors to reorganize 
their businesses by selling off money-losing divisions or readjusting the debt levels of 
an otherwise operationally sound business. See ELIZABETH WARREN, Chapter 11: 
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such, businesses often enter bankruptcy with a plan already in place, 
allowing bankruptcy proceedings to progress rapidly in order to expedite 
the rehabilitation of the debtor. 7   Financially distressed businesses 8 
endeavor to settle their debts and emerge from chapter 11 as quickly as 
possible.9  Plans of reorganization provide the means through which 
debtors may discharge their debts and resume their respective business 
activities.  Through plan confirmation, debtors effectively bind the 
estate10 while also improving their potential for success post-filing.11  As 
such, it is crucial that courts aggressively seek to maximize the 
bankruptcy estate prior to plan confirmation in order to ensure its 
finality.12 
																																																																																																																																													
REORGANIZING AMERICAN BUSINESSES 4–5 (2008).  Chapter 11 does not explicitly 
require insolvency prior to bankruptcy, and companies may file a bankruptcy petition 
under this chapter when facing tort liabilities, adverse outcomes in litigation, or in 
anticipation of liquidity issues. See JONES DAY, COMPARISON OF CHAPTER 11 OF THE 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY CODE WITH THE SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM, THE RESCUE PROCEDURE IN FRANCE, INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS IN 
GERMANY, AND EXTRAORDINARY ADMINISTRATION FOR LARGE INSOLVENT COMPANIES 
IN ITALY 49, 51 (2007), available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication 
/1ec093d4-66fb-42a6-8115be0694c59443/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 
e5b46572-7aeb-4c34-ab2e bee2f8f3d3c2/Comparison%20of%20Chapter%2011%20 
(A4).pdf. 
 7. Gerald P. Buccino & Steven M. Golub, Reflecting on Business Bankruptcies 
from the Pre-Code Era into the New Millennium, 18-JAN AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36, 37 
(Jan. 2000) (“[T]ransaction-minded professionals began to view chapter 11 as a means 
for rapidly effectuating a financial restructuring, similar to an exchange offer outside 
the bankruptcy context.”). 
 8. See sources cited supra note 6, discussing the sources of financial distress 
which may encourage a solvent business to file for bankruptcy. 
 9. Michelle Campbell & Todd Brents, Expedited Chapter 11s: Case 
Administration Workplan and Key Considerations, 29-OCT AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 76 
(Oct. 2010). 
 10. See Eubanks v. F.D.I.C., 977 F.2d 166, 170–71 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
plan confirmation is res judicata and binding upon all parties that might have a claim or 
interest against the estate). 
 11. See Anne Lawton, Chapter 11 Triage:  Diagnosing A Debtor’s Prospects for 
Success 15 (Mar. 7, 2012), available at http://works.bepress.com/anne_lawton/1 (“A 
traditional measure of success is the emergence of a debtor from chapter 11 with a 
feasible plan.”).  Under this study, plan confirmation was analyzed as a measure of 
success of chapter 11 cases, and only one third of the studied cases met this criteria to 
qualify as successful. Id. at 17. 
 12. See infra Part I.A.  Although plan confirmation generally binds the estate, 
following confirmation, courts retain the authority to “issue any other order necessary 
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Filing a chapter 11 petition commences a bankruptcy case, which 
creates a bankruptcy estate.13  Congress intended the bankruptcy estate 
to include an expansive range of property and interests.14  The current 
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”)15 greatly expanded the types of property 
within the scope of the estate and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of 
bankruptcy courts. 16   Successful reorganization requires that the 
bankruptcy estate be broad in order to account for all creditors’ claims 
as well as the implicit costs of chapter 11.17  The ability of a debtor to 
effectively fulfill its obligations in bankruptcy necessarily depends on 
the assets available to the estate.18  To this end, the bankruptcy estate 
includes both the available assets of the debtor as well as those claims of 
the debtor that existed prior to filing.19  Various provisions of the Code 
																																																																																																																																													
to administer the estate.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 3020(d); see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(ii) 
(2012) (requiring that in a plan of reorganization, holders of impaired claims receive at 
least as much as they would if the debtor had rather liquidated under chapter 7). 
 13. Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 246 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 
2001) (describing the breadth of the bankruptcy estate and how it comes into existence). 
 14. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204 (1983) (“Both the 
congressional goal of encouraging reorganizations and Congress’ choice of methods to 
protect secured creditors suggest that Congress intended a broad range of property to be 
included in the estate.”). 
 15. Title 11 of the United States Codes contains the relevant bankruptcy provision, 
and all references to Code provisions will refer to Title 11 unless otherwise noted. 
 16. Lee R. Bogdanoff, The Purchase and Sale of Assets in Reorganization Cases—
of Interest and Principal, of Principles and Interests, 47 BUS. LAW. 1367, 1373–74 
(1992).  The Code significantly expanded the types of property to be included in the 
estate from the very limited provisions contained in the prior Bankruptcy Act. Id.  The 
Code further broadened the scope of the bankruptcy estate by expanding bankruptcy 
courts’ jurisdiction beyond the confines of property within the debtor’s possession at 
the time of filing. Id. at 1376. 
 17. 11 U.S.C. § 1129.  Chapter 11 entails fees and expenses which frequently reach 
exceedingly high numbers. See Nancy B. Rapoport, The Case for Value Billing in 
Chapter 11, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 117, 119 (2012) (“Professional fees are big business, 
especially in large chapter 11 cases.”). 
 18. See Douglas Baird, Arturo Bris & Ning Zhu, The Dynamics of Large and Small 
chapter 11 Cases:  An Empirical Study 4–10 (2005), available at 
http://faculty.gsm.ucdavis.edu/~nzhu/papers/priority.pdf (explaining how distributions 
of estate assets are divided amongst the various classes of creditors in chapter 11 cases). 
 19. In re FitzSimmons, 725 F.2d 1208, 1210 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The scope of the 
estate is broad: it includes, with two minor exceptions, ‘all legal or equitable interests of 
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.’”) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 
541(a)(1)).  The scope of the bankruptcy estate extends to those current interests and 
property owned by the debtor, as well as all other interests, regardless of their 
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provide a statutory basis to ensure this maximization of the estate.20  
Broadly, chapter 11 endeavors to ensure that the commencement of the 
case preserves, rather than diminishes, the assets available for 
distribution to creditors. 21   Accordingly, at commencement, § 362 
automatically stays all actions against the estate at the filing of the order 
for relief.22  Section 541(a)(1) then provides that the bankruptcy estate 
includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of 
the commencement of the case.”23  The estate formed encompasses all of 
the debtor’s claims against others, as well as the debtor’s interests in 
property, whether they are full ownership, merely possessory, or even in 
the custody of third parties.24  Sections 362 and 541 operate in tandem to 
aggregate estate property by protecting it from piecemeal dismantling by 
creditors and by providing for the most inclusive estate.25 
Section 1123(b)(3)(B) builds upon these sections to further include 
those claims of the debtor existing prior to the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition as estate property. 26   This provision implicates traditional 
aspects of litigation such as notice 27  and res judicata. 28    Section 
1123(b)(3)(B) provides a potential exception to the binding nature of 
																																																																																																																																													
conditional, future, speculative or equitable nature. See In re Anders, 151 B.R. 543, 545 
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1993). 
 20. See 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (“Except as provided in section 1161 of this title, 
chapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a case under chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of this 
title.”). 
 21. Bogdanoff, supra note 16, at 1375. 
 22. 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
 23. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) . 
 24. WARREN, supra note 6, at 39. 
 25. 5 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.01, 
at 541.01–.10 (16th ed. 2013). 
 26. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B). 
 27. Allowing or disallowing the retention of claims under section 1123(b)(3)(B) 
can have serious implications for impacted creditors, requiring sufficient notice. See 
Ralph E. Avery, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Principles of Res Judicata, 102 COM. L.J. 
257, 280 (1997) (“Formal notice or actual knowledge of specific important events in the 
reorganization process is necessary to foreclose claimants whose identity is known to or 
reasonably ascertainable by the debtor.”); see also Spicer v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas 
II, LLC (In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling, Inc.), 422 B.R. 612, 625 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010), 
aff’d, 647 F.3d (5th Cir. 2011) (“[C]reditors must be able to view a proposed plan and 
properly evaluate the creditors’ benefits and potential liabilities . . . .”). 
 28. See infra Part I. 
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plan confirmation to ensure the maximum retention of estate property 
through plan confirmation.29 
Maximizing the bankruptcy estate serves the interests of both 
creditors and debtors.  Chapter 11 reorganizations are structured to 
enhance the ability of creditors and equity holders to recover value from 
a bankrupt enterprise.30  Increasing the available funds helps ensure that 
creditors can receive a reasonable return and enhances the potential for 
the successful restructuring and rehabilitation of the debtor.31  Chapter 
11 ultimately provides businesses with an opportunity to survive by 
putting the success of the entire group—including the debtor, the 
debtor’s employees, creditors, and other interested parties—above the 
rights of individual creditors.32 
This Note examines the role that plan confirmation plays in 
defining the scope of assets to be included in commercial chapter 11 
bankruptcy estates, with particular reference to claim retention under § 
1123(b)(3)(B).  Part I analyzes the effects of res judicata and provides a 
contextual basis for requiring finality in the confirmation of chapter 11 
plans of reorganization.  It reviews the background and provides a 
substantive overview of the statutory requirements of plan confirmation.  
Part I then identifies the role that § 1123(b)(3)(B) serves within this 
statutory scheme to promote the general purposes of chapter 11.  Part II 
provides an analysis of the competing ways in which courts interpret 
and apply § 1123(b)(3)(B).  It examines how courts apply § 
1123(b)(3)(B) in determining whether or not plans successfully retain 
claims and the rationale behind these decisions.  Part II also considers 
whether claims may be successfully retained throughdisclosure 
statements.  Finally, Part III discusses the potential weaknesses of 
requiring explicit reservations of claims.  It suggests a method for 
allowing general categorical reservations of claims, while still providing 
a reasonable level of certainty to creditors and potential defendants of 
claims retained post-confirmation. 
I. THE DISCRETIONARY PROVISION FOR CLAIM RETENTION UNDER § 
1123(B)(3)(B):  AN EXCEPTION TO THE RES JUDICATA EFFECT OF 
																																																																																																																																													
 29. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 30. Bogdanoff, supra note 16, at 1369. 
 31. See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 51 (2008) 
(“Chapter 11 strikes a balance between a debtor’s interest in reorganizing and 
restructuring its debts and the creditors’ interest in maximizing the value of the 
bankruptcy estate.”). 
 32. WARREN, supra note 6, at 15–16. 
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PLAN CONFIRMATION 
The policy behind res judicata is to avoid the “cost and vexation” of 
duplicative litigation.33  The general design and purpose of bankruptcy 
serves similar purposes, providing a fresh start, which releases both the 
debtor and the interested parties from pre-petition debts and 
obligations. 34   Under chapter 11, corporate debtors realize the res 
judicata effects of bankruptcy through the discharge represented by plan 
confirmation.35 
A. CONFIRMATION OF A PLAN OF REORGANIZATION UNDER § 1141 
A successful chapter 11 case culminates with the confirmation of a 
plan of reorganization under § 1141. 36   Plan confirmation generally 
provides the effects of res judicata in the bankruptcy context, though § 
1123(b)(3)(B) functions as an exception. 37   Section 1123(b)(3)(B) 
enables debtors to continue maximizing the value of the estate beyond 
plan confirmation through the retention of claims.38 
1. The Res Judicata Effect of Plan Confirmation 
The doctrine of res judicata has traditionally received great 
deference from courts. 39   Res judicata specifically refers to claim 
																																																																																																																																													
 33. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (“[R]es judicata . . . relieve(s) parties 
of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve(s) judicial resources, and, by 
preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage(s) reliance on adjudication.”). 
 34. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (noting that the discharge of 
indebtedness and debtor’s fresh start are primary purposes of bankruptcy). 
 35. See Eubanks v. F.D.I.C., 977 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1992) (“It has long been 
recognized that a bankruptcy court’s order confirming a plan of reorganization is given 
the same effect as a district court’s judgment on the merits for claim preclusion 
purposes.”). 
 36. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 37. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 38. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
 39. See, e.g., Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981) 
(“The doctrine of res judicata serves vital public interests beyond any individual judge’s 
ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular case.”); Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 
U.S. 726, 733 (1946) (“[W]e are aware of no principle of law or equity which sanctions 
the rejection by a federal court of the salutary principle of res judicata, which is 
founded upon the generally recognized public policy that there must be some end to 
litigation . . . .”); Hart Steel Co. v. R.R. Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917) (stating 
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preclusion, though courts have extended its application to include issue 
preclusion as well.40  As a general matter, the Supreme Court has long 
held that res judicata precludes the future litigation of claims that have 
received binding resolutions. 41   More broadly, the basic policies 
underlying res judicata preclude the re-litigation of matters and permit 
courts to foreclose subsequent litigation on matters that were never 
actually litigated, but that should have been advanced in a prior suit.42  
Res judicata in essence provides finality to all interested parties. 
The statutory goal of every chapter 11 bankruptcy case is the 
confirmation of a plan of reorganization. 43   Courts have substantial 
discretion in approving chapter 11 plans of reorganization, however, 
each plan must comply with the statutory requirements of the Code.44  
																																																																																																																																													
that res judicata is “a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, ‘of public policy and 
of private peace,’ which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the courts”) 
(citation omitted). 
 40. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (“The preclusive effect of a 
judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which are collectively 
referred to as ‘res judicata.’”). 
 41. See, e.g., Hart Steel Co., 244 U.S. at 299 (“[R]es judicata is not a mere matter 
of practice or procedure . . . . It is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, ‘of 
public policy and of private peace,’ which should be cordially regarded and enforced by 
the courts . . . .”) (citation omitted); Moitie, 452 U.S. at 398 (“A final judgment on the 
merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that 
were or could have been raised in that action.”). 
 42. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979) (“Res judicata prevents litigation of 
all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, 
regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.”); see 
Barnett v. Stern, 909 F.2d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 1990) (explaining res judicata is applied 
where the prior and present litigation share “(1) an identity of the parties or their 
privies; (2) an identity of causes of action; and (3) a final judgment on the merits in the 
prior litigation”); see generally, 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4403 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing the background 
and purpose of the rules of res judicata). 
 43. 7 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.01 
(16th ed. 2013) (“Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code provides the requirements for 
such confirmation, containing Congress’ minimum requirements for allowing an entity 
to discharge its unpaid debts and continue its operations.”); see In re St. James Mech., 
Inc., 434 B.R. 54, 61 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Confirmation of a debtor’s plan of 
reorganization is the seminal event in the chapter 11 bankruptcy process.”). 
 44. W. HOMER DRAKE, JR. & CHRISTOPHER S. STRICKLAND, CHAPTER 11 
REORGANIZATIONS § 1:1 (2d ed. 2012).  Bankruptcy courts have the power and 
discretion to confirm plans of reorganization where they meet the general framework 
provided for in the bankruptcy code and are “acceptable and beneficial to a majority of 
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Section 1129(a)(11) lays out a feasibility standard, which requires that a 
plan of reorganization provide “reasonable assurance, probability or 
prospect of success.”45  Implicit within this standard is the requirement 
that the plan provide a method for the estate to satisfy claims made by 
creditors, as a plan cannot otherwise satisfy the section’s basic terms.46 
If a plan of reorganization meets all of the confirmation 
requirements carefully drawn out in § 1129,47 then § 1141(a) binds all 
parties to its terms with preclusive effect.48  For the purposes of res 
judicata, the confirmation of a plan of reorganization is analogous to a 
final decision on the merits.49  While § 1141 is narrowly drafted, it has 
the effect of binding all parties under the plan upon confirmation.50  
Thus, all issues pertaining to the plan that could have been raised prior 
to confirmation are res judicata.51 
																																																																																																																																													
creditors . . . [that] may have a substantial voice in the ultimate plan that gains judicial 
approval.” Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121–1129 (2012)). 
 45. BANKRUPTCY SERVICE, LAWYERS EDITION § 45:231 (2013).  Section 1129(11) 
allows a court to confirm a plan only if it is not likely that confirmation will be 
followed by the debtor’s liquidation, or “the need for further financial reorganization, of 
the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or 
reorganization is proposed in the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129.  The feasibility standard does 
not require that the plan of reorganization guarantee success, it simply requires that it 
offer a reasonable assurance of success. Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-
Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 649 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 46. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9); see also supra note 45.  If a plan cannot provide 
for the repayment of claims made against it, than its success is not reasonably assured. 
See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 47. 11 U.S.C. § 1129. 
 48. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (“[T]he provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor, 
any entity issuing securities under the plan, any entity acquiring property under the 
plan, and any creditor, equity security holder, or general partner in the debtor.”).  The 
only exceptions to section 1141(a), found in (d)(2) and (d)(3), do not relate to section 
1123(b)(3)(B) claim retention.  11 U.S.C. § 1141; see Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Gray (In re 
Bankvest Capital Corp.), 375 F.3d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Pursuant to Section 1141 of 
the Bankruptcy Code, the confirmation of a plan of reorganization . . . precludes parties 
from raising claims or issues that could have or should have been raised before 
confirmation but were not.”). 
 49. Eubanks v. F.D.I.C., 977 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1992) (“It has long been 
recognized that a bankruptcy court’s order confirming a plan of reorganization is given 
the same effect as a district court’s judgment on the merits for claim preclusion 
purposes.”). 
 50. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 51. See 5 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 
1141.02 (16th ed. 2013) (stating that a confirmed plan binds “every entity that holds a 
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Plan confirmation provides a method of recovery for creditors,52 
while discharging the debtor from all debts that arose prior to plan 
confirmation. 53   Accordingly, this res judicata effect extends to all 
causes of action that became assets of the estate. 54   This finality, 
obtained through the confirmation of the plan of reorganization, 
reinforces the fundamental purpose of chapter 11 to rehabilitate troubled 
enterprises and discharge their debts.55 
2. An Exception to Res Judicata in Bankruptcy 
While res judicata reaches all areas of jurisprudence, including 
bankruptcy, there are certain exceptions.  In 1979, the Supreme Court 
refused to apply res judicata in a bankruptcy case where the questions 
were not precisely at issue in previous litigation and were matters that 
Congress intended bankruptcy courts to resolve. 56   The Bankruptcy 
Code and Rules “balance the policies represented by res judicata against 
the need for the process of reorganization to be flexible enough to 
accommodate the vagaries of business operations” in chapter 11 cases.57  
																																																																																																																																													
claim or interest even though [it] is not scheduled, has not filed a claim, does not 
receive a distribution under the plan, or is not entitled to retain an interest under such 
plan”). 
 52. See Rosemary E. Williams, Confirmation of Plan of Reorganization by 
Business Entity Under Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code, 94 AM. JUR. Proof of 
Facts 3d 1, I. §2 (2013) (stating that the purpose of a plan, as viewed by creditors, is “to 
distribute the assets of a debtor entity to creditors in full satisfaction (although not often 
in full payment) of the prepetition debts of and interests in the debtor entity”). 
 53. 11 U.S.C. § 1141. 
 54. See Elk Horn Coal Co. v. Conveyor Mfg. & Supply, Inc. (In re Pen Holdings, 
Inc.), 316 B.R. 495, 498 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2004). 
 55. Mark G. Douglas, Unscrambling the Egg or Redividing the Pie? Revoking a 
Chapter 11 Plan Confirmation Order, J. BANKR. L. 2006.10-5 (2006); see Retired 
Pilots Ass’n of U.S. Airways, Inc. v. US Airways Grp., Inc. (In re US Airways Grp., 
Inc.), 369 F.3d 806, 810 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining that parties rely on plans of 
reorganization once a confirmation order has been consummated). 
 56. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 (1979) (finding an exception to res judicata 
where a debt was previously reduced to judgment in state court, but allowing new 
evidence to be submitted in front of the bankruptcy court where “neither the interests 
served by res judicata . . . nor the policies of the Bankruptcy Act would be well served 
by foreclosing” its submission). 
 57. Avery, supra note 27, at 258.  To view chapter 11 cases as litigation, they must 
at least be viewed as nontraditional litigation because they involve both the resolution 
of past events as well as a “resolution capable of accommodating future events and the 
shifting interests of a multiplicity of parties.”  Id. 
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Although plan confirmation functions as a final judgment on the merits 
with regards to matters addressed in the plan of reorganization, 58  § 
1123(b)(3)(B) provides for a statutory exception to the binding nature of 
plan confirmation on preexisting claims.59 
Section 1123 of the Code provides a broad overview of the contents 
of a plan of reorganization.  More specifically, § 1123(b)(3)(B) provides 
debtors—or their representatives—with standing to bring claims that the 
debtor reserves in the plan, but not those that have not been so 
reserved.60  This section states that a chapter 11 plan of reorganization 
may provide for “the retention and enforcement by the debtor, by the 
trustee, or by a representative of the estate appointed for such purpose, 
of any . . . claim or interest”61 belonging to the debtor or the estate.62  
Generally, the estate of the debtor ceases to exist after plan 
confirmation, which then terminates the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 
court.63  Section 1123(b)(3)(B), however, provides an opportunity for 
the continued maximization of estate assets post-confirmation.64 
																																																																																																																																													
 58. See supra notes 48-49; see also Cohen v. TIC Fin. Sys. (In re Ampace Corp.), 
279 B.R. 145, 155 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002). 
 59. Robert C. Folland & Andrew L. Turscak, Jr., Preserving Estate Claims Post-
Confirmation:  A Need for Uniformity from the Circuit Courts, 27-MAR AM. BANKR. 
INST. J. 14, 75 (2008).  Res judicata applies to all areas of jurisprudence, but as applied 
to bankruptcy, “even where a claim would otherwise be barred by res judicata, Code 
§1123(b)(3)(B) may offer the plaintiff an escape hatch,” allowing for the retention of 
any claim or interest. Id. 
 60. Compton v. Anderson (In re MPF Holdings US LLC), 701 F.3d 449, 454 (5th 
Cir. 2012). 
 61. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B) (2012); see MPF Holdings, 701 F.3d at 453 
(“Section 1123(b)(3) . . . allows a debtor to retain causes of action possessed by the 
bankruptcy estate by providing for the retention of such claims in its reorganization 
plan.”). 
 62. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(A) (allowing for “the settlement or adjustment of any 
claim or interest belonging to the debtor or to the estate”). 
 63. Norwest Equip. Fin., Inc. v. Nath (In re D & P P’ship), 91 F.3d 1072, 1074 (8th 
Cir. 1996).  Although the estate may technically cease to exist following plan 
confirmation, “the debtor remains a debtor until the [T]itle 11 case has been closed 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350(a), and the bankruptcy court normally retains jurisdiction.” 
Joseph J. Wielebinski & J. David Leamon, Post-Confirmation Issues:  How To Fix 
What You Did Not Fix at Confirmation, BUS. BANKR. COURSE 1, 2 (2003), available at 
http://www.munsch.com/files/1117724_1.pdf. 
 64. See 11 U.S.C. 1123(b)(3)(B); see also Spicer v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas II, 
LLC (In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling, Inc.), 647 F.3d 547, 552 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[A]fter 
confirmation of a plan, the ability of the debtor to enforce a claim once held by the 
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Counter to the general policy behind res judicata, chapter 11 risks 
abandoning claims that have not actually received a final adjudication, 
outside that finality which plan confirmation provides. 65   Potential 
defendants and courts may carefully scrutinize the explicit language of 
the plan of reorganization and the disclosure statement in order to use 
res judicata as a defense to pursuing causes of action post-
confirmation. 66   While § 1123(b)(3)(B) may benefit debtors and/or 
creditors as a class by allowing for the reservation of certain claims, it 
also benefits the potential defendants of reserved claims by providing 
notice.67 
B. CLAIM RETENTION UNDER § 1123(B)(3)(B) 
The language of § 1123(b) establishes what a plan may contain, 
which is in contrast to the language of § 1123(a), which establishes what 
a plan must contain.68  Section 1123(b), however, operates subject to 
subsection (a).  While § 1123(b)(3)(B) provides the general framework 
under which pre-existing claims may be retained as estate property,69 it 
is §1123(a)(5)(A) that requires a plan of reorganization adequately 
provides for the plan’s implementation, such as through the “retention 
by the debtor of all or any of the property of the estate.”70 
1. The Purpose and Method Behind Retaining Claims 
Section 1123(b)(3)(B) allows debtors to retain causes of action to 
pursue post plan confirmation.71  It explicitly provides that any such 
claims or interests of the debtor, or the estate, may be retained through 
the plan of reorganization,72 and it further leaves open the possibility for 
																																																																																																																																													
estate is limited to that which has been retained in the [bankruptcy] plan.”) (citing 11 
U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B)). 
 65. See Eubanks v. F.D.I.C., 977 F.2d 166, 170–71 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 66. Wielebinski & Leamon, supra note 63, at 8. 
 67. Harstad v. First Am. Bank, 39 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir.1994). 
 68. COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION, BANKRUPTCY CODE PART I 896 (Alan N. Resnick 
& Henry J. Sommer eds., 2013) [hereinafter COLLIER PAMPHLET PART I]; see Cohen v. 
TIC Fin. Sys. (In re Ampace Corp.), 279 B.R. 145, 158 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) 
(“[Section] 1123 distinguishes between what a plan must include and what a plan may 
include.”). 
 69. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
 70. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(A). 
 71. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B). 
 72. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3). 
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claims to be retained in the disclosure statement. 73   It is, however, 
unclear how explicit the claim reservation must be to be enforceable.74 
Notice requirements represent a fundamental aspect of due 
process, 75  and notice underlies many aspects of bankruptcy case 
administration.76   The required disclosure of retained claims notifies 
creditors and potential defendants regarding causes of action the debtor 
intends to pursue post-confirmation. 77   Creditors may rely on the 
reservations made under § 1123(b)(3)(B) when evaluating potential 
distributions available under a proposed chapter 11 plan.78  Additionally, 
those creditors who might be defendants may also rely on such 
reservations to determine both their potential distributions as well as 
their potential liabilities.79  This notice requirement benefits both the 
																																																																																																																																													
 73. See infra Part II.C., see also 11 U.S.C. § 1125.  Courts have broad discretion to 
determine the adequacy of information contained in disclosure statements. S. REP. NO. 
95-989, at 120 (1978).  Section 1125 governs the content of post-petition disclosure 
according to the specific case circumstances; its legislative notes provide that courts 
have judicial discretion regarding the content of disclosure statements, as long as it is 
“of a kind and in sufficient detail that a reasonable and typical investor can make an 
informed judgment about the plan.” Id. at 120-122. 
 74. See infra Part II. 
 75. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).  At a 
minimum, due process requires that “deprivation of life, liberty or property by 
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature 
of the case.” Id. 
 76. See 11 U.S.C. § 342(a) (“There shall be given such notice as is appropriate, 
including notice to any holder of a community claim, of an order for relief in a case 
under this title.”). 
 77. Where a disclosure statement lists a party the debtor intends to bring an 
adversary proceeding against, proper notice may be a substantial component in the 
court’s determination of whether or not the claim may be pursued. See Steel Drum Co. 
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co (In re Goodman Bros. Steel Drum Co.), 247 B.R. 604, 608 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000).  The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy specifically require 
creditors and parties in interest receive a certain level of notice regarding the 
consideration of the disclosure statement and confirmation of the plan of 
reorganization. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017.  As such, section 1123(b)(3)(B) has been 
described as “fundamentally a notice provision.” In re Bleu Room Experience, Inc., 304 
B.R. 309, 314 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2004). 
 78. See Spicer v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas II, LLC (In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling, 
Inc.), 422 B.R. 612, 625 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010), aff’d, 647 F.3d (5th Cir. 2011) 
(“[C]reditors must be able to view a proposed plan and properly evaluate the creditors’ 
benefits and potential liabilities . . . .”). 
 79. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Crowley, Milner & Co. v. Callahan 
(In re Crowley, Milner & Co.), 299 B.R. 830, 851 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003). 
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estate’s creditors as a collective body, as well as the individual potential 
defendants.80  Debtors must comply with the statutory requirements of § 
1123(b)(3)(B)—giving general notice of the debtors’ intention to retain 
claims under the provision—because creditors are unable to seek their 
fair share of the recovery without sufficient notice of available assets.81 
Section 1123’s legislative history provides a background for its 
general purpose, but it provides only minimal guidance regarding what 
level of disclosure is sufficient to successfully retain claims. 82  While 
some courts permit general blanket, or categorical reservations of 
claims, other courts require a more demanding, specific and unequivocal 
reservation.83  Due to the absence of a clear standard regarding how 
																																																																																																																																													
 80. Compare Kmart Corp. v. Intercraft Co. (In re Kmart Corp.), 310 B.R. 107, 120 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) (“The disclosure and notice afforded by a section 1123(b)(3) 
retention provision, however, is directed towards the estate’s creditors, not the potential 
defendants on the reserved claims.”) and Elk Horn Coal Co. v. Conveyor Mfg. & 
Supply, Inc. (In re Pen Holdings, Inc.), 316 B.R. 495, 501 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2004) 
(“[I]t is notice to creditors generally that there are assets yet to be liquidated that are 
being preserved for prosecution by the reorganized debtor or its designee.”), with 
Harstad v. First Am. Bank, 39 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Creditors have the right 
to know of any potential causes of action that might enlarge the estate—and that could 
be used to increase payment to the creditors.”) and P.A. Bergner & Co. v. Bank One, 
Milwaukee, N.A. (In re P.A. Bergner & Co.), 140 F.3d 1111, 1117 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(allowing a retained claim to remain partly on the basis that the defendant had sufficient 
notice). 
 81. Harstad, 39 F.3d at 903. 
 82. DENNIS J. CONNOLLY, DAVID A. LANDER, & TIMOTHY M. LUPINACCI, 2012 
NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW SEMINAR MATERIALS:  PREFERENCE LITIGATION 80 (2012), 
available at http://www.nortoninstitutes.org/2012SeminarMaterials/12-Preference 
Litigation/M12-PreferenceLitigationTOC.html.    The legislative history notes that 
section 1123 was derived from the former section 216 of chapter X of the Bankruptcy 
Act. Id.  The legislative history of section 216 simply indicates that “its aim was to 
make possible the formulation and consummation of a plan before completion of the 
investigation and prosecution of causes of action.” Id. (citing Pen Holdings, 316 B.R. at 
499) (internal quotations omitted).  Congress adopted chapter X to provide increased 
protection to creditors and enhance their ability to participate in corporate 
reorganization proceedings, and subsequently, “[p]reservation of a debtor’s causes of 
action for the benefit of creditors was the goal of the liberalization of language in 
1978.” Pen Holdings, 316 B.R. at 499–500. 
 83. At the 86th Annual National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, practitioners 
discussed the relative requirements for preserving causes of action under section 
1123(b)(3)(B), as well as the risks and benefits of general, categorical, and specific 
reservations.  While there seemed to be no clear consensus regarding which method 
provided the best chance for successful claim retention, the overall importance of 
carefully drafting plan documents was made clear. Jay Horowitz, National Conference 
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specific claim retention must be, 84  courts and practitioners must 
independently navigate the uncertain language of § 1123(b)(3)(B) to 
ensure that claims are properly retained post-confirmation.85 
2. Standing to Pursue Retained Claims and the Extent of These Powers 
The ability to pursue claims retained under § 1123(b)(3)(B) lies 
with either the debtor-in-possession,86 the trustee,87 or a representative88 
																																																																																																																																													
of Bankruptcy Judges:  Individual Ch. 11s, Jurisdiction, Mortgages Are Hot Topics at 
Judges’ Conference, 24 BNA BANKR. L. REP. 1420 (2012). 
 84. In re Bleu Room Experience, Inc., 304 B.R. 309, 314 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
2004). 
 85. Courts have broad discretion to evaluate section 1123(b)(3)(B) claims as the 
provision is “not jurisdictional in nature but rather provides authority for the post-
confirmation pursuit of claims.” David R. Hurst, Laurie A. Krepto & Simon E. Fraser, 
The Scope of Post-Confirmation Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, ABI COMM. 
NEWSLETTER, 2008, at 13; see Susan E. Trent, Plan Drafting Requirements Pursuant to 
S 1123(b)(3)(b) Tackled, 32-FEB AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16, 16 (“The inclusion of 
sufficient claims retention language further provides a bankruptcy court with subject-
matter jurisdiction post-confirmation over the preserved pre-confirmation claims.”).  As 
there is currently no safe-harbor within the various standards applied to section 
1123(b)(3)(B), “[p]lan proponents should carefully consider how much disclosure is 
enough to preserve causes of action for post-confirmation litigation . . . disclosure will 
be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.” Robin Bicket White, Retaining Preference 
Actions in Plans of Reorganization - How Much Disclosure is Enough?, FROST, 
BROWN, TODD LLC, available at http://www.frostbrowntodd.com/resources-1567.html 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2013).  Debtors and courts must ultimately balance these 
uncertainties as to what is specifically necessary to successfully retain and enforce 
claims. 
 86. 8B C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 1131 (2013) (explaining that a chapter 11 debtor 
becomes a debtor-in-possession “once the bankruptcy petition is filed[,] and [it] is an 
entity that is legally distinct from the original debtor . . . . [U]nder the Bankruptcy 
Code, a debtor in possession has most of the rights, duties, and powers of the chapter 11 
trustee”). 
 87. Pursuant to section 1104, the court shall order the appointment of a trustee “[a]t 
any time after the commencement of the case but before confirmation of a plan, on 
request of a party in interest or the United States trustee, and after notice and a hearing . 
. . .” 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012).  However, the Code’s ultimate aim is to protect creditors, 
thus its policies are flexible, and it is within a court’s discretion to determine if there is 
cause to appoint a trustee. Comm. of Dalkon Shield Claimants v. A.H. Robins Co., 828 
F.2d 239, 242 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 88. In order for a party, who is neither the debtor nor the trustee, to be a 
representative for the purposes of enforcing a section 1123(b)(3)(B) claim, the party 
must establish “(1) that it has been appointed [and] (2) that it is a representative of the 
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appointed for such purpose. 89   Debtors-in-possession and trustees 
perform the same functions in chapter 11 cases. 90   Insofar as any 
representative of the estate exercises his or her powers in dealing with 
retained claims, he or she has a fiduciary obligation to ensure both the 
successful rehabilitation of the bankruptcy estate and a reasonable return 
to creditors.91 
Debtors-in-possession have the ability to pursue claims following 
the filing of a chapter 11 petition.  Unless a trustee is appointed, 92 the 
																																																																																																																																													
estate.” Retail Mktg. Co. v. King (In re Mako, Inc.), 985 F.2d 1052, 1054 (10th Cir. 
1993) (citation omitted). 
 89. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
 90. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery 
(In re Cybergenics Corp.), 226 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that because a 
debtor-in-possession has the powers and duties of a trustee, “[t]he terms ‘trustee’ and 
‘debtor in possession,’ as used in the Bankruptcy Code, are thus essentially 
interchangeable”). 
 91. See e.g., United States v. Aldrich (In re Rigden), 795 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 
1986) (holding that a representative of a bankruptcy estate “has a fiduciary obligation to 
conserve the assets of the estate and to maximize distribution to creditors” in pursuing 
retained claims); Cybergenics Corp., 226 F.3d at 243 (“A paramount duty of a trustee 
or debtor in possession in a bankruptcy case is to act on behalf of the bankruptcy estate, 
that is, for the benefit of the creditors.”); Mako, Inc., 985 F.2d at 1054 (noting that in 
order for a party, who is neither the debtor nor the trustee, to be a representative for the 
purposes of enforcing a § 1123(b)(3)(B) claim, the party must establish “(1) that it has 
been appointed; [and] (2) that it is a representative of the estate”) (citation omitted). 
 92. Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. v. Coolbrands Int’l, Inc. (In re Ice Cream 
Liquidation, Inc.), 319 B.R. 324, 333 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2005) (“[I]f no trustee is 
appointed, during the chapter 11 case prior to plan confirmation the debtor enjoys the 
status of debtor in possession with all the relevant powers of a trustee.”).  By allowing 
the debtor to become a debtor-in-possession following the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition, chapter 11 enables the debtor to retain management and control of the 
bankrupt entity’s business operations, barring proof that the appointment of a trustee is 
warranted. See 8B C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 1131 (2013); see also In re Adelphia Commc’ns 
Corp., 336 B.R. 610, 655 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 342 B.R. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(“[T]here is a strong presumption that the debtor should be permitted to remain in 
possession absent a showing of need for the appointment of a trustee.”).  Additionally, 
chapter 11 reserves to the debtor the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization for 
the first 120 days after filing an order for relief, both allowing the debtor the 
opportunity to present a plan that will enable it to emerge from bankruptcy reorganized 
and providing an acceptable return to creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b); Karen Gross & 
Patricia Redmond, In Defense of Debtor Exclusivity:  Assessing Four of the 1994 
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 291 (1995) 
(“[E]xclusivity is perceived to encourage rehabilitation by empowering the debtor to 
control its own destiny . . . . [Thus] the exclusive right to file a plan can be seen as the 
debtor’s chip in the reorganization game.”). 
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debtor-in-possession serves as the bankruptcy estate’s legal 
representative after the commencement of the case.93  Absent a trustee, 
the Code grants a debtor-in-possession many of the rights and powers of 
a trustee and permits the debtor-in-possession to perform all of a 
trustee’s duties and functions.94  Generally, when a plan is confirmed, 
the estate ceases to exist and the debtor’s trustee powers expire because 
the debtor-in-possession loses the possession that granted him the ability 
to exercise the claims power of a trustee.95  A debtor, however, may still 
pursue those claims that have been properly reserved in the plan of 
reorganization.96 
In a case where a trustee is appointed, the debtor may reserve the 
power to pursue claims for the trustee, who will then pursue the claims 
following plan confirmation in lieu of the debtor.97  Under § 323(b), 
																																																																																																																																													
 93. Smart World Techs., LLC v. Juno Online Servs., Inc. (In re Smart World 
Techs., LLC), 423 F.3d 166, 174 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he debtor-in-possession’s role [is] 
legal representative of the bankruptcy estate, [as] set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 323(a).  As 
legal representative, the debtor-in-possession has the power to sue and be sued on the 
estate’s behalf.”) (footnote omitted). Large chapter 11 reorganizations rarely involve 
the appointment of a trustee, so the debtor generally fills this role. See Stephen J. 
Lubben, Bankruptcy Venue and the Delaware Solyndra Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 
2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/19/bankruptcy-venue-and-the-delaware-
solyndra-ruling/ (defending the rarity of appointing trustees in big chapter 11 cases by 
explaining that such appointment often results in conversion to chapter 7, which results 
in “basically nothing for [] unsecured creditors”); see In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 
1217, 1225 (3d Cir. 1989) (“It is settled that appointment of a trustee should be the 
exception, rather than the rule.”). 
 94. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (“[A] debtor in possession shall have all the rights, other than 
the right to compensation under section 330 of this title, and powers, and shall perform 
all the functions and duties, except the duties specified in sections 1106(a)(2), (3), and 
(4) of this title . . . .” ); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9001(11) (“‘Trustee’ includes a debtor in 
possession in a [C]hapter 11 case.”). This power, however, is subject to the powers of 
any later-appointed trustee or court-prescribed limitations. 11 U.S.C. § 1107. 
 95. Dynasty Oil & Gas, LLC v. Citizens Bank (In re United Operating, LLC), 540 
F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2008); see 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b) (“Except as otherwise provided 
in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the 
property of the estate in the debtor.”); Compton v. Anderson (In re MPF Holdings US 
LLC), 701 F.3d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 2012) (“In general, when a chapter 11 reorganization 
plan is confirmed by the bankruptcy court, the debtor losses [sic] its debtor-in-
possession status and with it, standing to pursue the estate’s claims.”). 
 96. MPF Holdings, 701 F.3d at 454 (Debtors have standing after the plan is 
confirmed “to bring claims that the debtor reserved in the reorganization plan[,] but 
[they] will not have standing to bring claims that were not reserved in the plan.”). 
 97. Id. at 453. 
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trustees have the ability to sue third parties for the benefit of the estate 
throughout the duration of a chapter 11 case.98  This power may extend 
beyond the confirmation of a plan of reorganization, allowing the trustee 
to pursue claims retained in the plan under § 1123(b)(3)(B).99 
C. THE TYPES OF CLAIMS WHICH CAN BE RETAINED 
Section 1123(b)(3)(B) allows for post-confirmation pursuit and 
enforcement of claims when the recovery will benefit the estate and the 
debtor has appropriately reserved the cause of action.100  The statutory 
language of § 1123(b)(3)(B) explicitly includes all claims and 
interests.101  The types of claims potentially retained102 may include:  (1) 
lender liability,103 (2) malpractice,104 and (3) breach of contract claims.105  
Section 1123(b)(3)(B) does not confine claim retention to certain 
categories of claims, but rather provides a general means for debtors to 
																																																																																																																																													
 98. 11 U.S.C. § 323.  The provision does not contain any durational limitations.  
Id.; see also supra note 20. 
 99. See Syndicate Exch. Corp. v. Duffy (In re Pro Greens, Inc.), 297 B.R. 850, 856 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003) (“A reorganization trustee, post-confirmation, may pursue 
claims, including avoidance actions against third parties, on behalf of the estate if the 
confirmed plan and order of confirmation so provides.”). 
 100. COLLIER PAMPHLET PART I, supra note 68, at 898. 
 101. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B). 
 102. Whether claim retention is successful or unsuccessful will depend on the 
court’s interpretation and application of §1123(b)(3)(B). See infra Part II for a 
discussion of the various methods employed by courts. 
 103. See, e.g., Sanders Confectionery Prods., Inc. v. Heller Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d 474, 
482 (6th Cir. 1992); Sure-Snap Corp. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 948 F.2d 869, 877 
(2nd Cir. 1991). 
 104. See Nat’l Benevolent Ass’n of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) v. 
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP (In re Nat’l Benevolent Ass’n of the Christian Church 
(Disciples of Christ)), 333 F. App’x 822, 827 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 105. In Envirodyne Industries, Inc. v. Conn. Mutual Life Co. (In re Envirodyne 
Industries, Inc.), a breach of contract claim valued at $100 million, that was not 
explicitly reserved was under dispute. 174 B.R. 986, 991 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994).  
Although the issues could technically have been litigated prior to confirmation, 
Envirodyne argued that such litigation was impossible due to the rapid progression of 
the bankruptcy proceedings. Id.  The court noted that it might have been “better policy” 
if an action of such magnitude were disclosed in the disclosure statement, but found that 
the failure to reserve the action was not fatal. Id.  The court, however, did not reference 
section 1123 or any potential reservations in the plan of reorganization, rather it relied 
on section 546(a)(1) and the presence of only minimal damage to the defendants due to 
the late filing of suit. Id.; see also discussion supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
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provide for the continued maximization of the estate post-
confirmation.106 
The Code explicitly permits trustees—and thus debtors-in-
possession107—to pursue certain claims for the benefit of the estate.108  
Section 1123(b)(3)(B) provides a statutory basis under which debtors 
and trustees can retain and enforce these claims post-confirmation.109  
The claims retained under § 1123(b)(3)(B) often include avoidance 
actions,110 which are explicitly referenced in chapter 5 of the Code.111  
Litigating all preference actions prior to plan confirmation may be either 
impractical or impossible,112 so avoidance actions involving preferences, 
as described in § 547(b), 113  are commonly retained using § 
																																																																																																																																													
 106. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B). 
 107. Dynasty Oil & Gas, LLC v. Citizens Bank (In re United Operating, LLC), 540 
F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2008); see 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b) (“Except as otherwise provided 
in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the 
property of the estate in the debtor.”); Compton v. Anderson (In re MPF Holdings US 
LLC), 701 F.3d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 2012) (“In general, when a chapter 11 reorganization 
plan is confirmed by the bankruptcy court, the debtor losses [sic] its debtor-in-
possession status and with it, standing to pursue the estate’s claims.”). 
 108. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 109. § 1123(b)(3)(B) (A plan may provide for “the retention and enforcement by the 
debtor, by the trustee, or by a representative of the estate appointed for such purpose, of 
any such claim or interest”). 
 110. For a brief overview of avoidance actions, see John D. Ayer, Michael Bernstein 
& Jonathan Friedland, Overview of Avoidance Actions, 23-MAR AM. BANKR. INST. J. 
26 (2004). 
 111. The Code provides explicit limits on avoiding powers, both protecting 
vulnerable creditors and potential defendants and providing a reasonable level of 
finality and notice.  Section 546 prescribes limitations on the time under which an 
action may be commenced under sections 544, 545, 547, 548, or 553, along with other 
explicit limitations. 11 U.S.C. § 546.  Section 551 supports the expansive nature of the 
estate provided for under section 541 by automatically preserving any property of the 
estate from avoided transfers for the benefit of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 551. 
 112. Elk Horn Coal Co. v. Conveyor Mfg. & Supply, Inc. (In re Pen Holdings, Inc.), 
316 B.R. 495, 498–99 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2004). 
 113. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).  Preference claims, a type of avoidance action, allow a 
trustee to recover money, property, or lien rights that were the subject of a preferential 
transfer, but the law is strict and a trustee must prove the six elements in section 547(b) 
before recovery. Harlin DeWayne Hale & Andrew G. Edson, Preferences in 
Bankruptcy Cases, or Do I Really Have to Give the Money Back?, 60-FEB FED. LAW. 
66 (2013).  Allowing trustees to bring preference claims protects the estate against 
preferential treatment of certain creditors, to the detriment of others, where the 
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1123(b)(3)(B).114  Plans of reorganization may also seek to retain claims 
involving actions under § 548 for the avoidance of fraudulent transfers 
and other obligations incurred by the debtor,115 as well as actions to 
recover setoffs under §553(b)(1).116  By allowing for post-confirmation 
pursuit of these claims, § 1123(b)(3)(B) broadens the scope of the 
powers provided for by chapter 5 of the Code in order to maximize the 
estate.117 
D. THE TRUSTEE’S POWER TO SETTLE OR ADJUST ESTATE CLAIMS AND 
INTERESTS 
In addition to the power to retain claims under § 1123(b)(3)(B), 
debtors-in-possession and trustees also have the separate ability to adjust 
and settle claims. 118    While the fiduciary duties that the debtor-in-
possession and the trustee owe to the creditors and shareholders 
necessarily limit these abilities,119 both parties have exceptionally broad 
discretion in exercising their settlement powers.120 
																																																																																																																																													
recipients of such transfers receive more than they otherwise might. 11 U.S.C. § 
547(b)(5). 
 114. The impractical nature of litigating all preference actions prior to plan 
confirmation necessitates the right of a reorganized debtor to overcome the res judicata 
effect of confirmation and reserve the right to bring such actions post confirmation. Pen 
Holdings, 316 B.R. at 498–99; see Kmart Corp. v. Intercraft Co. (In re Kmart Corp.), 
310 B.R. 107, 119 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 115. 11 U.S.C. § 548.  Allowing the retention of fraudulent transfer claims enables 
the trustee to assist in “avoid[ing] fraud and self-dealing by a debtor at the expense of 
the estate’s creditors.” United States v. Sims (In re Feiler), 218 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
 116. 11 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1); see Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Exxon Co. (In re Braniff 
Airways, Inc.), 814 F.2d 1030, 1040 (5th Cir. 1987) (“If section 553(b) is applicable, 
pre-petition setoffs within the 90 day period before filing that improve the creditor’s 
position can be recovered by the trustee.”). 
 117. See infra Part II. 
 118. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019 (“[T]he court may approve a compromise or 
settlement.  Notice shall be given to creditors, the United States trustee, the debtor, and 
indenture trustees as provided in Rule 2002 and to any other entity as the court may 
direct.”). 
 119. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 
(1985). 
 120. See, e.g., Shaia v. Three Rivers Woods, Inc. (In re Three Rivers Woods, Inc.), 
No. 98-38685, 2001 WL 720620, at *5–7 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 20, 2001).  The trustee 
brought a motion to compromise a claim in a chapter 7 case, and a hearing was held to 
determine whether the settlement was reasonable, as “a compromise or settlement will 
most likely gain approval if it is both fair and equitable, as well as representative of the 
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Allowing debtors-in-possession and trustees to waive and settle 
claims enables them to exercise their judgment for the benefit of the 
estate. 121   Claims, including those explicitly retained under § 
1123(b)(3)(B), may be settled under § 1123(b)(3)(A).122  Debtors-in-
possession and trustees have broad power to settle matters, and courts 
generally defer to their judgment where it conceivably benefits the 
estate.123 
II. NAVIGATING § 1123(B)(3)(B) TO DETERMINE THE SUFFICIENCY OF 
CLAIM RESERVATIONS 
While courts vary in their precise interpretations of § 
1123(b)(3)(B), a clear split exists as to whether general or categorical, 
reservations of claims will suffice, or whether even more express 
reservations are required.124  Courts have broad discretion to permit very 
general claim reservations in plans of reorganization and disclosure 
statements under the broad language of § 1123(b)(3)(B).125  There is no 
direct statutory requirement for explicit or individual reservation of 
claims in order to pursue such claims post-confirmation.126  Courts must 
then rely on wavering standards when determining whether to permit the 
retention of claims under particular circumstances, and these 
determinations have a lasting impact due to the res judicata effect of 
plan confirmation. 
																																																																																																																																													
best interests of the estate as a whole.” Id. at 6 (internal quotations omitted).  A court 
has even gone as far as to interpret the permissive language in Rule 9019 to allow a 
trustee discretion over whether or not to seek court approval of a settlement. See In re 
Dalen, 259 B.R. 586, 598–99 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2001). 
 121. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 122. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2012). 
 123. See W. HOMER DRAKE, JR. & CHRISTOPHER S. STRICKLAND, CHAPTER 11 
REORGANIZATIONS § 12:21 (2d ed., 2012) (explaining that “[a] settlement generally will 
be approved if it falls within the zone or range of reasonableness, allows the debtor to 
concentrate on running the business, avoids significant expenses and inconvenience of 
suit, is otherwise fair and equitable in its terms, and serves the interests of equity 
securities holders generally”). 
 124. Compare discussion Part II.A. with discussion infra Part II.B. 
 125. See infra Part II.A. 
 126. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B). 
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A. GENERAL “BLANKET” RESERVATIONS IN PLANS OF REORGANIZATION 
The most generous view regarding the reservation of claims under 
§ 1123(b)(3)(B) allows for blanket reservations.127  These broad, all-
encompassing reservations enable debtors to simply reserve all claims, 
which may add significant value to the estate by allowing for maximum 
claim retention.128  Allowing blanket reservations of debtors’ right to 
pursue claims also expedites the confirmation process.129   Requiring 
debtors to identify and catalogue the specific claims to be retained post-
confirmation would require that debtors evaluate all claims filed against 
the debtor and the debtor’s estate, in order to decide whether to pursue, 
reserve, or abandon any claims prior to starting the process of plan 
confirmation.130  Although blanket reservations relieve debtors of this 
burden, courts rarely permit such broad reservations of causes of action 
in either the plan or the disclosure statement.131 
JP Morgan Trust Co. v. Mid-America Pipeline Co. provides a 
prime example of why courts might permit general claim reservations.132  
The plan of reorganization granted the trustee “exclusive right to 
‘enforce any and all present or future Litigation Claims’ . . . whether 
known or unknown, that the Debtors, the Estates, or the Bankruptcy 
Committees may hold or assert against any non-Debtor Entity.” 133  
Based on this blanket reservation, the trustee sought to retain, for the 
																																																																																																																																													
 127. See infra Part II.B. for a discussion of alternative views. 
 128. See JP Morgan Trust Co. v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1281 
(D. Kan. 2006). 
 129. Cohen v. TIC Fin. Sys. (In re Ampace Corp.), 279 B.R. 145, 159 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2002) (explaining that requiring debtors to determine all possible actions to be 
preserved before confirmation would slow down the reorganization process to the 
detriment of both creditors and debtors); see also Amarex Inc. v. Marathon Oil Co. (In 
re Amarex, Inc.), 74 B.R. 378, 380 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1987), aff’d, 88 B.R. 362 (W.D. 
Okla. 1988) (“. . . §1123(b)(3)(B) serves the useful function of allowing confirmation of 
a plan before possible claims against others have been fully investigated and pursued.”). 
 130. In re Weidel, 208 B.R. 848, 853 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1997) (requiring debtors to 
catalog all objections to claims in the plan of reorganization or disclosure statement 
“would be lengthy, would seriously delay the proposal of a plan as well as 
confirmation, and would eat into the debtor’s exclusivity period”). 
 131. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 132. Mid-Am. Pipeline, 413 F. Supp. 2d. at 1280–81. 
 133. Id. at 1278.  The plan of reorganization further defined ‘Litigation Claims’ as 
all “claims, rights, causes of action, defenses, counterclaims, suits or proceedings, 
whether in law or in equity.” Id. 
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benefit of the estate, a non-bankruptcy claim for the termination of a 
lease, valued at potentially $30 million.134 
The defendants opposed the reservation of the claim under § 
1123(b)(3)(B) as lacking sufficient specificity. 135   They argued that 
while general reservations may preserve “garden variety preference or 
avoidance action[s],” they should not suffice to reserve a claim of this 
magnitude. 136   The court, however, did not find merit in this 
distinction.137   The district court broadly held that the purpose of § 
1123(b)(3)(B) is at least partly to provide notice to creditors regarding 
potential funds that could increase the estate and thus the distributions to 
creditors.138 
Blanket reservations, such as the one found in this plan of 
reorganization, provide sufficient notice to creditors and defendants 
alike. 139   Courts may enforce such broad reservations in order to 
promote the maximization of the bankruptcy estate.140  Due to the res 
judicata effect of plan confirmation, 141  permitting such broad claims 
reservations offers debtors the widest latitude to pursue claims post-
confirmation for the benefit of the estate.142 
B. SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS IN PLANS OF REORGANIZATION 
The majority of courts faced with deciding whether retained claims 
may be enforced pursuant to § 1123(b)(3)(B) have found that a more 
express reservation of such claims in the plan of reorganization is 
required.143  Some of these courts interpret this to require simply that the 
debtor disclose categories of claims the debtor intends to retain, while 
other courts require disclosure of the particular claims. 
																																																																																																																																													
 134. Id. at 1280–81. The defendants terminated a lease for the use of a pipeline for 
transporting natural gas to a refinery owned by the debtor. Id. at 1254. 
 135. Id. at 1280. 
 136. Id. at 1280–81. 
 137. Id. at 1281. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 142. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 143. Tracar, S.A. v. Silverman (In re Am. Preferred Prescription, Inc.), 266 B.R. 
273, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining that a majority of courts have held “the plan must 
expressly reserve the right to pursue that particular claim post-confirmation and that a 
blanket reservation allowing for an objection to any claim is insufficient”). 
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1. Categorical Reservations 
No clear standard exists as to what exactly is required to enforce 
claims reservations, but many courts find categorical claims reservations 
to be sufficient.  While not as narrow as individual reservations of 
claims, 144  categorical reservations still narrow the scope of allowed 
claims by requiring extra foresight from debtors and necessitating more 
specificity than blanket claims reservations. 145   Allowing for the 
reservation of categories of claims provides notice to those potential 
defendants who might want to object to the plan’s reservation prior to 
confirmation, 146  while still enabling debtors to maximize the estate 
through § 1123(b)(3)(B) claim retention. 147   Categorical reservations 
promote bankruptcy’s goal of ensuring that all similarly situated 
creditors are treated alike, and they help ensure that recoveries from 
retained causes of action serve to benefit creditors, and more specifically 
unsecured creditors.148 
In In re P.A. Bergner & Co., the Seventh Circuit supported this 
balancing of the general goals of bankruptcy with the rights of creditors 
and the need to maximize the bankruptcy estate.149  The court held that 
																																																																																																																																													
 144. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 145. See supra Part II.A. 
 146. Defendants of claims retained post-confirmation have multiple opportunities to 
object to such reservations prior to the binding effect of plan confirmation under section 
1141(a).  Defendants whom fail to object prior to confirmation are precluded from later 
objecting to the enforcement of the causes of action. Cohen v. TIC Fin. Sys. (In re 
Ampace Corp.), 279 B.R. 145, 160 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002). 
 147. Regardless of the stated purpose for allowing categorical reservations of claims 
under section 1123(b)(3)(B), courts that do so encourage claims that would otherwise 
be abandoned to be included as estate property.  See, e.g., Buckley v. Goldman, Sachs 
& Co., No. 02- 11497, 2005 WL 1206865 (D. Mass. May 20, 2005) (finding retention 
of cause of action permissible where plan language specifically referenced the intent to 
retain avoidance actions); Katz v. I.A. Alliance Corp. (In re I. Appel Corp.), 300 B.R. 
564, 567–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d, 104 F. App’x 199 (2d Cir. 2004) (allowing the 
reservation of claims arising under the Code’s recovery provisions); Temex Energy, 
Inc. v. Hastie & Kirschner (In re Amarex, Inc.), 96 B.R. 330, 333 (W.D. Okla. 1989) 
(permitting the general reservation of preference and fraudulent transfer actions in the 
plan); Texas Consumer Fin. Corp. v. First Nat’l City Bank, 365 F. Supp. 427, 432 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (allowing reservation of preference actions where the plan specifically 
retained jurisdiction to pursue such actions). 
 148. See Retail Mktg. Co. v. King (In re Mako, Inc.), 985 F.2d 1052, 1054–56 (10th 
Cir. 1993). 
 149. P.A. Bergner & Co. v. Bank One, Milwaukee, N.A. (In re P.A. Bergner & Co.), 
140 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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the language of § 1123(b)(3)(B) is sufficiently broad to allow for 
categorical reservation of claims, which are express in their 
categorization but do not specifically identify individual claims. 150  
Here, the debtor commenced adversary proceedings to recover 
preferential payments in the amounts of $31,207,000 and $6,358,000.151  
The plan of reorganization explicitly retained avoidance and recovery 
actions, but it did not specifically identify the claims in question.152 
The court held that plans need only retain claims of a given type 
and found that the actions were not barred.153  The court went even 
further in emphasizing the importance of recovery to the estate, finding 
that the recovery action should be allowed even though it would not 
directly benefit creditors, but instead would benefit the reorganized 
entity.154  Bankruptcy courts have subsequently relied on this case to 
find categorical reservations of claims sufficient, 155  promoting the 
wealth maximization of the estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. 
The First and Tenth Circuits have similarly held that categorical 
reservations of claims satisfy the requirements of § 1123(b)(3)(B).  In In 
re Bankvest Capital Corp., the First Circuit expressly chose not to 
address whether §§ 1123 and 1141 operated together to give plan 
confirmation a res judicata effect, but the court still found that the plan 
properly retained the avoidance action at issue.156  The language in the 
plan only generally authorized the liquidating supervisor to “investigate, 
prosecute and, if necessary, litigate, any Cause of Action,” but the 
definition provided for “Cause of Action” expressly included avoidance 
actions. 157   The defendant argued that while the plan did reserve 
avoidance actions, it did not specifically reserve the avoidance action at 
issue.158  The court, however, found the categorical reservation sufficient 
to preserve the representative of the bankruptcy estate’s general right to 
																																																																																																																																													
 150. Id. at 1117. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1118. 
 155. See, e.g., Kmart Corp. v. Intercraft Co. (In re Kmart Corp.), 310 B.R. 107, 124 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 156. Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Gray (In re Bankvest Capital Corp.), 375 F.3d 51, 59–60 
(1st Cir. 2004). 
 157. Id. at 59. 
 158. Id. at 60. 
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bring avoidance actions. 159   The Tenth Circuit came to the same 
conclusion in In re Mako, finding categorical reservations of avoidance 
actions sufficient under § 1123(b)(3)(B), indicating to debtors that such 
categorical reservations may be sufficient to retain post-petition 
claims.160 
In finding a general reservation of claims insufficient in Harstad v. 
First American Bank, the Eighth Circuit implied that a more express 
categorical reservation might have been sufficient. 161    The plan 
contained a “Continuing Jurisdiction” provision which provided that the 
bankruptcy court would retain jurisdiction over “all causes of actions 
[sic] between Debtors and any other party, including but not limited to 
any right of Debtors to recover assets pursuant to the provisions of the 
Code.”162  The court focused on the lack of sufficient notice to creditors, 
affirming the bankruptcy court’s holding that the debtors lacked 
standing to pursue a claim due to insufficient reservation in the plan of 
reorganization.163  The bankruptcy court focused its holding on the need 
for those subject to preference actions to be explicitly aware of this 
possibility in the plan in order to confirm the plan properly. 164  
Highlighting the language of § 1123(b)(3)(B), the court explained that 
retention language must be clear and unequivocal.165  The circuit court 
held that debtors should specifically reserve their right to pursue certain 
types of claims post-confirmation, as creditors are entitled to know the 
debtors’ intention to pursue preference actions.166  Although the court 
affirmed the bankruptcy court’s holding, finding the blanket reservation 
insufficient, the court did not explain precisely what type of reservation 
would be sufficient.167 
																																																																																																																																													
 159. Id. 
 160. Retail Mktg. Co. v. King (In re Mako, Inc.), 985 F.2d 1052, 1056 (10th Cir. 
1993) (holding that the reservation of avoidance actions was sufficient to expressly 
reserve such a cause of action in the plan of reorganization). 
 161. Harstad v. First Am. Bank, 39 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 162. Id. at 902. 
 163. Id. at 904. 
 164. Harstad v. First Am. Bank (In re Harstad), 155 B.R. 500, 509–10 (Bankr. D. 
Minn. 1993), aff’d, No. 4-90-869, 1994 WL 526013 (D. Minn. Jan. 20, 1994), aff’d, 39 
F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 165. Harstad, 155 B.R. at 510.  The court reasoned that “Congress specifically said: 
If a debtor wants to preserve what would normally be lost, its plan must provide for 
such retention.  Congress knew how to provide a specific exception.  Debtors must 
know how to invoke it.” Id. 
 166. Harstad, 39 F.3d at 903. 
 167. Id. 
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The Fifth Circuit consistently identifies its standard as requiring 
“specific and unequivocal” claim reservations,168 however, in practice, 
this seems to permit categorical reservations.  The Fifth Circuit adopted 
this approach in In re United Operating, LLC. 169   The plan of 
reorganization in this case broadly retained “any and all claims arising 
under the Code,” and it also more expressly reserved certain categories 
of claims covered under the Code.170   The court held, however, that 
neither of these reservations was sufficient to retain the common-law 
claim at issue.171  The court grounded its argument in bankruptcy’s basic 
goal of settling all assets and liabilities of a debtor promptly and 
effectively.172  The court did not state how unequivocal the reservation 
must be to satisfy this heightened standard and permit retention of the 
breach of contract claim.173   The court, however, did cite to other cases 
finding categorical reservations sufficient. 174   While a specific and 
unequivocal standard sounds as if it would necessitate extremely 
detailed reservations, categorical reservations might still provide the 
debtor standing to pursue those claims owned by the estate prior to plan 
confirmation. 
The Fifth Circuit subsequently held in In re Texas Wyoming 
Drilling, Inc., that where a plan simply reserved “Avoidance Actions 
against pre-petition shareholders of TWD,” it specifically and 
unequivocally retained the claims.175  The court did not decide whether 
individual defendants must be identified. 176   Rather, it found the 
reservation, which included a class of prospective defendants, 
sufficient. 177   Although this reservation appears to be categorical, it 
																																																																																																																																													
 168. Dynasty Oil & Gas, LLC v. Citizens Bank (In re United Operating, LLC), 540 
F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 356. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 355. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id.  It is unclear whether a reservation of “all common-law causes of action” 
would have been sufficient, or whether the debtor would have been required to more 
specifically retain all breach of contract claims. 
 175. Spicer v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas II, LLC (In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling, Inc.), 
647 F.3d 547, 552 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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provides more by naming a class of defendants.178  It is unclear whether 
without this specific identification of defendants, a general reservation 
of avoidance actions would have been enforceable.179 
Most recently, the Fifth Circuit somewhat clarified the application 
of its “specific and unequivocal” standard in In re MPF Holdings US 
LLC.180  In reversing the bankruptcy court’s ruling that the reservation 
language in the plan was too ambiguous, the court held that plan 
language that preserved all avoidance actions, except those individual 
actions explicitly abandoned, was sufficiently specific and 
unequivocal. 181   The language referenced categories of claims to be 
reserved, but it failed to specify any potential defendants.182  While the 
court in effect held that claims reservations do not need to name 
potential defendants, the decision did not explicitly state this, nor did it 
reveal any bright line rule as to what exactly is required to meet the Fifth 
Circuit’s “specific and unequivocal” standard.183 
Delaying plan confirmation by requiring specific and unequivocal 
reservations of individual claims or defendants under § 1123(b)(3)(B) 
risks delaying creditors’ recovery or inducing debtors to expedite plan 
confirmation by abandoning claims to the detriment of the estate.184  
Categorical reservations indicating the type or category of reserved 
claims provide sufficient notice that claims might be pursued post-
																																																																																																																																													
 178. Id. The Fifth Circuit did not clearly establish whether claims reservations must 
somehow identify potential defendants to satisfy the specific and unequivocal standard. 
Compare Moglia v. Keith (In re Manchester, Inc.), Adv. No. 09-3027, No. 08-30703, 
2009 WL 2243592 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 16, 2009) (finding the reservation “specific 
and equivocal” even though it failed to list the names of potential defendants), with In 
re MPF Holding US LLC, 443 B.R. 736 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011), rev’d Compton v. 
Anderson (In re MPF Holdings US LLC), 701 F.3d 449, 457 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(concluding rather that all potential defendants must be individually identified in the 
plan). 
 179. The court did not specifically address this matter in In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling, 
Inc., 647 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 180. Compton v. Anderson (In re MPF Holdings US LLC), 701 F.3d 449, 457 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (holding reservation of claims in plans of reorganization must be sufficiently 
specific and unequivocal to be enforced). 
 181. Id. at 456–57. 
 182. Id. at 457. 
 183. In re MPF Holdings US LLC, 701 F.3d 449. 
 184. Katz v. I.A. Alliance Corp. (In re I. Appel Corp.), 300 B.R. 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003), aff’d, 104 F. App’x 199 (2d Cir. 2004).  Delaying creditors’ recovery and 
unnecessarily speeding up the plan confirmation process both undermine the Code’s 
purpose of achieving “maximum distribution in the minimum time with all creditors of 
the same class sharing ratably.” Id. (citation omitted). 
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confirmation. 185   Categorical reservations promote general judicial 
deference, and courts approving such claims reservations balance the 
need for specificity and finality with the goal of maximizing the 
bankruptcy estate for the benefit of both the creditor and debtor.186 
2. Reservations of Individual Claims 
Courts have also interpreted the res judicata effect of plan 
confirmation to require explicit reservations of individual claims. 187  
Courts requiring such express reservations set a very high bar on 
debtors’ ability to pursue pre-existing claims pursuant to § 
1123(b)(3)(B).188  In these cases, where a plan merely contains a general 
reservation or categorical reservations of claims, the plan of 
reorganization is binding and functions as res judicata, barring a debtor 
or trustee from bringing any individual actions which the plan does not 
expressly reserve.189 
Just one year prior to its decision in In re P.A. Bergner & Co.,190 
the Seventh Circuit in effect held, without reference to § 1123, that 
reservations of claims in chapter 11 plans must be more specific than 
general or categorical reservations.191  In D & K Properties Crystal Lake 
v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, the court decided whether a 
paragraph in the debtor’s confirmed plan, permitting the disbursing 
agent to “enforce all causes of action existing in favor of the Debtor,” 
was sufficient to avoid the defense of res judicata and allow the agent to 
																																																																																																																																													
 185. Cohen v. TIC Fin. Sys. (In re Ampace Corp.), 279 B.R. 145, 160 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2002) (allowing for the general reservation of avoidance actions).  The court 
emphasized that where there is a general reservation of preference or avoidance actions, 
those creditors who might be subject to such a reserved claim are properly on notice 
that individual claims against them are being reserved. Id. at 161; see also Cooper v. 
Tech Data Corp. (In re Bridgeport Holdings, Inc.), 326 B.R. 312, 327 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2005). 
 186. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
 187. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 190-197. 
 188. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 190-197. 
 189. Eric W. Anderson, Can the Disclosure Statement Supplement the Plan to 
Preserve Estate Claims?, 30-OCT AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26, 84 (2011). 
 190. P.A. Bergner & Co. v. Bank One, Milwaukee, N.A. (In re P.A. Bergner & Co.), 
140 F.3d 1111, 1117 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 191. See D & K Props. Crystal Lake v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 257 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
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pursue a bad faith breach of contract claim.192  The court held that to 
reserve individual claims, the claims must be expressly and specifically 
identified in the plan.193  The court focused its holding on the purpose of 
finality in a confirmed plan, finding that general reservations function to 
reserve nothing.194 
Similarly, in In re Kelley, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel emphasized that the policy of the Code prefers the debtor disclose 
all potential causes of action in its finding that the claims at issue were 
not effectively reserved in the confirmed plan.195  The case involved the 
debtor’s potential reservation of counterclaims against claims of 
creditors that the debtor had expressly disclosed in its plan.196  While the 
plan disclosed the claims of the creditors, there was no explicit 
reservation of the counterclaims to permit the debtor to pursue those 
causes of action post-confirmation.197  The court held that res judicata 
does not apply where a confirmed plan expressly reserves the right to 
litigate a specific cause of action post-confirmation. 198  Since, however, 
the debtor did not expressly reserve the counterclaims, they could not be 
pursued.199 
 In practice, few courts strictly require explicit reservations of 
individual causes of action.  Courts, however, may still find debtors and 
trustees to be barred from bringing actions that are not individually 
reserved pursuant to the broad language of §§ 1123 and 1141.200  In the 
absence of any clear standard permitting less exacting claims 
reservations, the interpretation of particular claims reservations remains 
uncertain. 
C. RESERVATIONS IN DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS 
The Bankruptcy Code and Rules provide for the filing of a 
disclosure statement to supplement the plan of reorganization, unless the 
																																																																																																																																													
 192. Id. at 260. 
 193. Id. at 261.  The court favorably cited In re Kelley, which required individual 
claims be identified in order to be retained. Id. at 261; see also Kelley v. S. Bay Bank 
(In re Kelley), 199 B.R. 698, 703–04 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996). 
 194. D & K Props., 112 F.3d at 261. 
 195. Kelley, 199 B.R. at 703. 
 196. Id. at 704. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 190-197. 
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debtor intends the plan itself  to provide adequate information.201  Under 
§ 1125(a)(1), the disclosure statement should provide such adequate 
information as is required for an investor to make an informed judgment 
regarding the plan.202  Debtors may choose to reserve claims in their 
disclosure statements, regardless of whether they are also reserved in the 
plan, but it is unclear whether these reservations will be enforceable 
under § 1123(b)(3)(B).203 
Where a plan of reorganization does not provide sufficient grounds 
for supporting the enforcement of post-confirmation causes of action, 
courts may look to the disclosure statement to determine whether to 
permit claim retention.204  Courts differ in their view as to whether such 
reservation in a disclosure statement is necessary or sufficient,205  and 
accordingly in the specificity required in order for such reservations to 
be enforceable.206  Ultimately, the language in § 1123(b)(3)(B) neither 
explicitly nor implicitly addresses whether claims may also be preserved 
in the disclosure statement nor the level of specificity which would be 
required.207 
The Sixth Circuit addressed the potential inclusion of claims 
reservations in a disclosure statement in Browning v. Levy. 208   In 
																																																																																																																																													
 201. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3016: 
In a chapter . . . 11 case, a disclosure statement under § 1125 of the Code or evidence 
showing compliance with § 1126(b) shall be filed with the plan or within a time fixed 
by the court, unless the plan is intended to provide adequate information under § 
1125(f)(1). If the plan is intended to provide adequate information under § 1125(f)(1), 
it shall be so designated and Rule 3017.1 shall apply as if the plan is a disclosure 
statement. 
 202. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012). 
 203. See, e.g., Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 204. Spicer v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas II, LLC (In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling, Inc.), 
647 F.3d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[C]ourts routinely consult the disclosure statement 
in deciding whether res judicata and judicial estoppel apply.”). 
 205. In In re Kelley, the court held that that “if the debtor fails to mention the cause 
of action in either his schedules, disclosure statement, or plan, then he will be precluded 
from asserting it post-confirmation.” 199 B.R. 698, 704 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996).  By 
using the word either, the court again implies that if sufficient, a claims reservation in a 
disclosure statement might be acceptable, even in the absence of such a reservation in 
the plan of reorganization. 
 206. See, e.g., Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. v. Coolbrands Int’l, Inc. (In re Ice Cream 
Liquidation, Inc.), 319 B.R. 324 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2005); Browning, 283 F.3d 761. 
 207. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B); see also Spicer v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas II, LLC 
(In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling, Inc.), 647 F.3d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 208. Browning, 283 F.3d at 774. 
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Browning, the plan of reorganization failed to reserve the claim at issue; 
however, the disclosure statement provided for a blanket reservation of 
rights.209  The court broadly held that a general reservation of rights in a 
disclosure statement is not sufficient to avoid the res judicata effect of 
plan confirmation.210  The court left open the possibility that a more 
express reservation in the disclosure statement, despite no reservation in 
the plan, might be sufficient to allow for the enforcement of reserved 
claims.211 
Furthermore, where a plan does not retain post-confirmation 
claims, courts may permit claim retention in the disclosure statement to 
supplement the plan.  For instance, in In re Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc., 
the court found that a disclosure statement can sufficiently put creditors 
on notice regarding potential post-confirmation preference actions.212  
Denying a debtor the ability to pursue claims properly retained in the 
disclosure statement, but not in the plan, serves only to provide a 
windfall to the potential defendants at the expense of both the debtor and 
the creditors.213 
Claim reservations included in disclosure statements may also serve 
to cure insufficient reservations in plans.  While, as a general matter, the 
Fifth Circuit requires specific and unequivocal reservations of claims to 
permit retention,214 it has allowed the disclosure statement to provide 
such reservation.215  In In re Texas Wyoming Drilling, Inc., the Fifth 
Circuit held that where the plan generally reserved avoidance actions 
and the disclosure statement further reserved the right to retain 
avoidance actions against specified prospective defendants, the specific 
and unequivocal standard was met.216  The disclosure statement may 
																																																																																																																																													
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See id. 
 212. Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. v. Coolbrands Int’l, Inc. (In re Ice Cream 
Liquidation, Inc.), 319 B.R. 324, 337 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2005). 
 213. Appeal of SWR, Inc., 12-1 BCA P 34988 (A.S.B.C.A.), ASBCA No. 56708, 
2012 WL 1075711, at *6–7 (Armed Services Bd. Of Contract Appeals Mar. 19, 2012). 
 214. See supra notes 168-183 and accompanying text.  Though, as previously 
discussed, it is unclear precisely what “specific and unequivocal” requires. 
 215. Spicer v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas II, LLC (In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling, Inc.), 
647 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 216. Id. at 552.  The court in Goldin Assocs., L.L.C. v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette 
Securities Corp. held that a debtor’s general reservation of claims in the plan of 
reorganization should be read in conjunction with the disclosure statement. No. 00-
8688, 2004 WL 1119652, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2004).  Thus, a more specific 
reservation of claims in the disclosure statement may permit pursuing such actions, 
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thus supplement the plan to provide added specificity and adequate 
information to creditors. 
While apparent that the language in § 1123(b)(3)(B) provides 
minimal guidance as to what is required to properly reserve claims in a 
plan of reorganization, 217  the language does explicitly confine claim 
reservations to those made within the plan.218  Section 1123(b)(3)(B) 
provides that a plan may provide for the retention of claims, but 
nowhere in its language does it reference the ability to retain claims in 
disclosure statements.219  Still, courts may look to disclosure statements 
to cure insufficient reservations of claims in the plan, or more broadly, 
to support such reservation where the plan entirely lacks any 
reservation. 
III. STANDARDIZING THE APPROACH TO ANALYZING POST-
CONFIRMATION CLAIM RETENTION 
Plan confirmation effectively releases claims, having a res judicata 
effect in chapter 11, in the absence of the exception provided for by § 
1123(b)(3)(B).220  The current standard, or lack thereof, for determining 
whether or not claims may be retained post confirmation leaves 
bankruptcy courts largely on their own to determine what standard to 
apply,221 and practitioners are left to guess as to how much specificity is 
sufficient when drafting plans of reorganization. 222   Without a clear 
standard, plan proponents risk abandoning claims and estate property 
																																																																																																																																													
where an otherwise insufficient blanket reservation in the plan would not.  Basic 
contract law also supports reading and interpreting the disclosure statement and the plan 
as a whole, considering their unified execution and intertwined subject matter.  See 
Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v. Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 107 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 217. See supra Part II. 
 218. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123. 
 219. 11 U.S.C. § 1123; see also Tex. Wyo. Drilling, 647 F.3d at 551 (“§ 
1123(b)(3)(B) does not explicitly or implicitly address whether claims may also be 
preserved in the disclosure statement.”).  Only in rare cases, where a literal 
interpretation would forsake the drafters’ intent, should courts step outside of the plain 
meaning of statutes.  See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 
(1989). 
 220. See supra Part I.A. 
 221. See Envirodyne Indus., Inc. v. Conn. Mut. Life Co. (In re Envirodyne Indus., 
Inc.), 174 B.R. 986 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994). 
 222. See supra Part II.B. 
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depending both on the specificity in the drafting of their plan documents 
and the standard applied by the court in evaluating them.223 
A. THE ROLE OF § 1123(B)(3)(B) IN MAXIMIZING ESTATE VALUE 
As debtors increasingly use chapter 11 as a tool to financially 
restructure companies, it also comes under criticisms for the low returns 
received by unsecured creditors. 224   Claim retention under § 
1123(b)(3)(B) provides a means to enhance the scope of the bankruptcy 
estate and potentially increase the distributions to creditors. 225 
Maximizing the estate for the general benefit of creditors supports a 
broad allowance of retained claims, which categorical reservations in the 
plan of reorganization provide.226  Since plan confirmation is the goal of 
chapter 11 cases,227 enabling creditors to rely on such broad reservations 
has the potential to encourage creditors to approve plans where 
outstanding causes of action belonging to the debtor might increase the 
potential distributions.228 
The Code explicitly provides for an expansive estate after debtors 
file an order for relief under chapter 11.229  While the language of § 
1123(b)(3)(B) fails to provide an explicit standard for determining the 
permissiveness of retained claims,230 other parts of § 1123 aid in its 
interpretation.  As a general matter, § 1123(b)’s provisions are subject to 
subsection (a)’s provisions. 231   Section 1123(a)(5)(A), in particular, 
provides that “a plan shall provide adequate means for the plan’s 
implementation, such as retention by the debtor of all or any part of the 
																																																																																																																																													
 223. See supra Part II.B-C. 
 224. Theodore Eisenberg & Stefan Sundgren, Is Chapter 11 Too Favorable to 
Debtors? Evidence from Abroad, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1532, 1533 (1997). 
 225. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.  When creditors evaluate a plan of 
reorganization, prior to voting on it, they analyze the potential distributions it provides. 
 226. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 227. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra notes 132-134 and accompanying text.  The ability to rely on broad 
reservations enables debtors to confirm plans of reorganization without the fear of 
abandoning potentially large claims, and subsequently diminishing their relative 
distributions. 
 229. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra Part II. 
 231. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b) (2012); see also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 
(1984) (“Where, as here, resolution of a question of federal law turns on a statute and 
the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory language.”). 
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property of the estate.”232  Under § 541, claims of the debtor are property 
of the bankruptcy estate,233  and thus they should generally be retained 
by the debtor for the purposes of applying § 1123(b)(3)(B).  Considering 
that there is no explicit requirement that debtors retain causes of action 
for the benefit of the estate, 234  and because the language of § 
1123(b)(3)(B) is susceptible to a reading permitting broad 
reservations,235 courts should interpret the provision within the general 
policies of bankruptcy.236 
B. INTERPRETING THE LANGUAGE OF § 1123(B)(3)(B) TO BROADEN THE 
ESTATE 
The permissive language of § 1123(b)(3)(B) provides that debtors 
may reserve causes of action.237  Encouraging a broad interpretation of 
the language of § 1123(b)(3)(B) advances the goal of the bankruptcy 
code to protect creditors.238   Further, it promotes the maximization of 
the bankruptcy estate by easing the burden on plan proponents in 
drafting enforceable statements of claim retention in their plan 
documents.239  The language of § 1123(b)(3)(B) should be read broadly 
to support the maximum possible bankruptcy estate for the benefit of 
both creditors and debtors.240 
While blanket reservations of all outstanding claims do support the 
maximization of the bankruptcy estate, 241  they provide insufficient 
notice, allowing debtors to retain any and all potential claims post-
confirmation with mere boilerplate language. 242   Courts frequently 
address the sufficiency of notice in determining whether claims 
reservations are enforceable.243  Where res judicata is implicated, notice 
																																																																																																																																													
 232. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(A). 
 233. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
 234. Section 1123(b)(3)(B) is written in permissive terms, using may as opposed to 
shall. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B). 
 235. See supra Part II.A. 
 236. See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text. 
 237. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B). 
 238. See infra note 266. 
 239. See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. 
 241. JP Morgan Trust Co. v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1281 (D. 
Kan. 2006). 
 242. See supra Part I.A. 
 243. See supra notes 75-81. 
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provides an important judicial function.244  General blanket reservations 
fail to meet minimal standards of providing notice to potential 
defendants, considering the finality that § 1141 is intended to provide 
upon the confirmation of a plan of reorganization. 245   Case law, 
however, provides little guidance beyond the fact that courts generally 
find blanket reservations impermissible under § 1123(b)(3)(B).246 
1. Categorically Avoiding Unnecessary Specificity 
Courts should adopt a more uniform, stringent requirement that 
debtors can rely on in drafting plan documents.  Courts, however, should 
not go as far as requiring the cataloguing of individual claims or 
potential defendants to permit claim retention in a plan of 
reorganization, as it is ultimately unnecessary and may be prejudicial to 
the estate.247  Requirements that plans reserve claims with “specific and 
unequivocal” language leaves open the possibility that courts will 
require more than simple categorical claim reservations. 248   The 
requirement that claim reservations be “specific and unequivocal” 
merely replaces an ambiguous statute, open to varying interpretations, 
with a slightly less ambiguous standard.249  Allowing general categorical 
reservations, however, provides reasonable notice to creditors, while 
																																																																																																																																													
 244. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra Part I.A. 
 246. See supra Part II.A. 
 247. Prior to the enactment of The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), debtors were able to obtain nearly endless 
extensions of their exclusivity period “for cause” under section 1121 to file a plan of 
reorganization. See Jeffrey M. Schlerf, BAPCPA’s Impact on Exclusivity Is Hard to 
Gauge, TURNAROUND MGMT. ASSOC. (July 1, 2007), http://www.turnaround.org/ 
Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=7797.  The lack of limits on debtors’ exclusivity 
period was criticized for resulting in unnecessary delays, and giving the debtors undue 
bargaining leverage to force, otherwise unwilling, creditors to settle. Id.  Debtors’ 
virtually unrestricted ability to obtain extensions to file a plan did, however, provides 
debtors with the extensive time it might require to catalogue every single claim 
intended to be retained under § 1123(b)(3)(B).  BAPCA limited this ability by fixing 
the debtor’s exclusivity period at 120 days under § 1121(b), with only the possibility of 
an extension up to 18 months with court approval. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b)-(d); see also 
Paolo Manganelli, The Evolution of the Italian and U.S. Bankruptcy Systems–A 
Comparative Analysis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 237, 254 (2010). 
 248. See supra notes 177-179 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra notes 171-173 and accompanying text. 
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also providing debtors reasonable guidelines under which to draft plans 
of reorganization.250 
Allowing broad categorical reservations permits courts to take into 
account and balance the role of reserved claims against the need for 
finality upon plan confirmation.251  The context of the reservation at 
issue should be examined to determine whether the particular 
reservation sufficiently reveals the potential assets available for 
distribution to creditors.252  Courts are more than capable of determining 
whether a given claim fits into a certain category of reservations.253  
Where a debtor, for instance, retains all avoidance actions, courts can 
properly infer that the debtor intended to retain preference actions.254  
Additionally, holders of claims within those retained categories, and 
other interested parties, receive sufficient notice that plan confirmation 
will not alter the debtors’ pre-existing right to enforce those causes of 
action.255 
Moreover, regardless of whether courts permit claims to be retained 
under § 1123(b)(3)(B), other laws governing the claims will still apply 
to protect prospective defendants.  The Code contains implicit 
protections for the causes of action that debtors frequently seek to retain 
post-confirmation. 256   Where a debtor generally retains avoidance 
actions, such as preference, fraudulent conveyance, or set-off actions, 
those sections’ stringent requirements must still be met.257  Furthermore, 
where retained claims are for causes of action outside of bankruptcy, 
such as personal injury  or breach of contract claims, other defenses 
such as statute of limitations and the statute of frauds will still apply.258  
																																																																																																																																													
 250. See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 252. See Elk Horn Coal Co. v. Conveyor Mfg. & Supply, Inc. (In re Pen Holdings, 
Inc.), 316 B.R. 495, 504 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2004). 
 253. See supra Part II.B.1. Where a debtor categorically retains “all avoidance 
actions,” courts can conclude that the debtor intended to retain preference actions.  
Similarly, where a debtor retains “all contract actions,” courts can reasonably infer that 
the debtor intended to retain causes of action for breach of contract. 
 254. See supra notes 149-153. 
 255. See supra note 75. 
 256. See supra note 111. 
 257. See, e.g., supra note 113. 
 258. Section 558 of the Code reserves to the debtor all defenses available outside 
bankruptcy law. 11 U.S.C. § 558 (2012).  As a matter of equity, defendants of claims 
brought by the debtor would not be barred from asserting appropriate defenses. 
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As such, specific and unequivocal reservations of these claims, beyond 
mere categorical reservations, are unnecessary. 
2. Compromising Finality with Claim Retention 
In order for the confirmation of a plan of reorganization to 
compromise a claim, the court must determine that it is both fair and 
equitable to the estate.259  Under Federal Bankruptcy Rule 9019, for 
either a compromise or even a settlement of a claim to be approved, the 
court must authorize it after notice and hearing. 260   Debtors-in-
possession and trustees even have broad discretion under the business 
judgment rule and fair and equitable standards to waive or release 
claims contained in a plan where it is in the best interest of the estate.261  
Since the rights of creditors may also be harmed by denying claim 
retention under § 1123(b)(3)(B), 262  courts should have to determine 
whether abandoning a claim for being improperly retained under § 
1123(b)(3)(B) is fair and equitable. 263   Considering the individual 
treatment that compromises, settlements, and waivers of claims receive, 
it is both reasonable and manageable for claims retained categorically 
under § 1123(b)(3)(B) to receive similar treatment.264 
Ultimately, allowing potentially significant claims to be disposed of 
because they were not sufficiently retained in the plan of reorganization 
betrays basic principles of the Code, and it denies creditors the right to 
seek the maximization of the estate through the enforcement of pre-
																																																																																																																																													
 259. In this determination, the court considers the: “(a) probability of success in 
litigation; (b) difficulties, if any, to be encountered in matter of collection; (c) 
complexity of litigation involved, and expense, inconvenience, and delay necessarily 
attending it; and (d) paramount interest of creditors and proper deference to their 
reasonable views.” BANKRUPTCY SERVICE, LAWYERS EDITION § 44:158; JPMorgan 
Chase Bank v. Charter Commc’ns Operating LLC (In re Charter Commc’ns), 419 B.R. 
221, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Courts look to whether releases are in the estate’s 
best interest, as well as the role they play in the Plan and the value the Plan brings to the 
estate.”). 
 260. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019. 
 261. See U.S. Bank. Nat’l Assoc. v. Wilmington Trust Co. (In re Spansion, Inc.), 
426 B.R. 114 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010). 
 262. See infra Part I.A. 
 263. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.  If courts can make 
determinations of fairness and equitability in these scenarios, it seems reasonable they 
make them when deciding whether or not claims have been properly reserved. 
 264. See infra Part I.C. 
270 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XIX 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
existing claims post-confirmation. 265   The concept of the “creditor’s 
bargain heuristic” has been advanced to promote the concept that 
bankruptcy should neither increase nor decrease those rights creditors 
would have bargained for pre-petition. 266   Overly restrictive claims 
reservations requirements may delay plan formation and confirmation 
by increasing the litigation prior to confirmation, subsequently reducing 
creditor recoveries. 267   Permitting broad claim retention under § 
1123(b)(3)(B) supports a creditor-friendly approach to chapter 11 
reorganizations.268  Those creditors with legitimate claims against them 
are not losing the benefit of their bargain by having these claims 
enforced,269 and the bankruptcy estate as a whole benefits through the 
maximization of estate property.270 
Debtor corporations use chapter 11 to reorganize as going concerns, 
generating the income necessary to pay pre-petition creditors.271  Having 
access to as large a pool of funds as possible when attempting to 
generally satisfy obligations to creditors greatly benefits debtors while 
reorganizing.272   Foreclosing potentially retained claims by requiring 
																																																																																																																																													
 265. Elk Horn Coal Co. v. Conveyor Mfg. & Supply, Inc. (In re Pen Holdings, Inc.), 
316 B.R. 495, 504 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2004) (“§ 1123(b)(3) protects the estate from 
loss of potential assets. It is not designed to protect defendants from unexpected 
lawsuits.”).  Although some of these claims may be against creditors with active claims, 
in the form of avoidance actions, this does not negate the need to actively pursue all 
monies owed to the debtor in favor of the creditors as a class. 
 266. WARREN, supra note 6, at 13.  Scholars have gone as far as to argue that 
creditor protection is the exclusive rationale for bankruptcy. See id.; see also Robert E. 
Scott, Through Bankruptcy With the Creditors’ Bargain Heuristic, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
690, 694 (1986) (“The central premise underlying the creditors’ bargain vision is that 
bankruptcy is a foreseeable risk that can be (and is) borne individually by the various 
claimants of any business enterprise, including secured and unsecured creditors, 
shareholders, and managers.”). 
 267. Michael H. Goldstein, Res Judicata Strikes Twice, 21-OCT AM. BANKR. INST. 
J. 16, 41 (2002). 
 268. DENNIS J. CONNOLLY, DAVID A. LANDER, & TIMOTHY M. LUPINACCI, 2012 
NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW SEMINAR MATERIALS: PREFERENCE LITIGATION 81 (2012), 
available at http://www.nortoninstitutes.org/2012SeminarMaterials/12-Preference 
Litigation/M12-PreferenceLitigationTOC.html. 
 269. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
 271. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. PSS S.S. Co. (In re Prudential Lines 
Inc.), 928 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 272. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text, see also Chapter 11: 
Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, UNITED STATES COURTS, available at 
2013] BROADENING THE ESTATE—§ 1123(B)(3)(B) 271 
explicit designations of such claims risks diminishing the size of the 
estate, 273  thereby reducing the funds available for distribution to 
creditors. 274   Permitting broad categorical claim retention under § 
1123(b)(3)(B) rather serves to benefit both the debtor and the creditors 
as a whole by allowing for a more efficient plan confirmation.275 
CONCLUSION 
The language of § 1123(b)(3)(B) provides minimal guidance 
regarding the level of specificity required in order to retain claims post 
confirmation, through either the plan of reorganization or disclosure 
statement.  Case law similarly fails to provide a clear standard or 
consistent guidance as to how to determine whether debtors sufficiently 
retain claims.  Even those courts purporting to apply a certain standard 
vary in their application of those standards and their justifications for so 
applying them. 
While the majority of courts require more than a blanket 
reservation of claims, there does not exist a uniform standard for 
applying § 1123(b)(3)(B).  Courts should adopt a uniform standard—
one that permits broad categorical reservations.  Then, retained claims 
can be individually addressed to determine whether they fit 
appropriately within the categories of claims retained by the debtor.  In 
the absence of such a standard, debtors are left unsure as to the 
specificity required in their chapter 11 filings, and potential defendants 
may or may not be on notice of those causes of action which may be 
brought against them. 
 
																																																																																																																																													
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter11.aspx 
(“After the plan is confirmed, the debtor is required to make plan payments and is 
bound by the provisions of the plan of reorganization.”). 
 273. See supra notes 132-138 and accompanying text.  Failing to permit the 
retention of the claim at issue would have greatly diminished the size of the estate and 
the funds available for distribution. 
 274. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 275. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
